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Although  the current period is often characterized as one of  flexible ex- 
change rates,  many currencies are tied together in joint floats against other 
currencies,  forming exchange rate unions within a system of flexible rates. 
This paper  investigates how  a small country fares by joining  such an  ex- 
change rate union.’ 
The country is assumed to be buffeted by real and monetary disturbances 
originating at home and abroad. By joining the union,  this country  is able 
to fix the exchange rate between its currency and the currencies of the union 
countries.  The central  question  addressed  in  the  paper  is  whether  or not 
fixing this exchange rate helps to modify the effects of disturbances on the 
domestic economy. 
The paper shows that the impact of a union depends on several key fac- 
tors2 
This paper was written while I was a visiting professor at the Ecole Supkrieure des Sciences 
Economiques  et  Commerciales.  I  would  like  to  thank  Joshua  Aizenman,  Bernard  Dumas, 
Jacques Melitz, and  Charles  Wyplosz  for their helpful  comments.  Financial  support from  a 
German Marshall Fund Fellowship and a National Science Foundation grant (SES-8006414) is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
1.  The terminology  here  is potentially  confusing. In  this  study, the  term  “exchange  rate 
union”  refers  to  an  arrangement  in  which  member  countries of  each union  maintain  fixed 
exchange rates  between  member  currencies, but  with  each country  retaining  its own  central 
bank with control over its national monetary policy. This limited type of  union, which Corden 
(1972, p.  3) calls a “pseudo exchange  rate union,”  is to be distinguished  from a “complete 
exchange  rate  union,”  or  monetary  union,  with  a  single  central  bank  and  a  union-wide 
currency. 
2.  Tower and Willett (1976) provide a comprehensive survey of  the literature on optimum 
currency  areas which examines the conditions necessary for successful exchange rate or mon- 
etary unions; Allen and Kenen (1980, chap.  14) discuss the more recent literature. Among the 
more important contributions  are those of  Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963).  Corden (1972), 
and Ingram (1973). A recent paper by  Canzoneri (1981) compares exchange rate unions with 
more general forms of exchange market intervention. 
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1.  Wage and price behavior at home and abroad, a factor emphasized by 
Corden (1972) in his study of  monetary  integration.  Wage behavior abroad 
determines the specific form which foreign disturbances take in the domestic 
economy, while wage behavior at home determines the difference which the 
choice of  regime makes to the behavior of domestic output. 
2. The trade pattern of the country joining the union. What is important 
is not just the general  openness of  the economy, as in  McKinnon  (1963), 
but the share of trade between  potential  member countries  relative to trade 
with the rest of the world. 
3.  The sources and types of  economic disturbances giving rise to fluctua- 
tions in exchange rates. To some extent the analysis will follow that of the 
literature on fixed versus flexible exchange rates, of which Mundell’s (1963) 
study is representative. But the decision to join a union is more complicated 
than  that;  when  there  are  two  foreign  countries  or regions  involved,  the 
specific source of  foreign disturbances becomes important, as well  as any 
correlation between disturbances originating in different countries. Of partic- 
ular  interest  will  be  foreign  disturbances  which  are alternatively  positively 
and  negatively  correlated, since these  have very different  implications  for 
the choice between regimes. 
The  paper  will  investigate  two  intuitively  plausible  propositions  about 
these last two factors:  that the case for a union  is stronger when the home 
country trades primarily  with other countries  in the union  and when  distur- 
bances primarily  originate outside the union. 
The national models used to investigate the effects of the union consist of 
three basic equations: an aggregate demand equation dependent on the terms 
of  trade  as  well  as foreign output,  an  aggregate  supply equation  derived 
from a wage indexation model, and a financial equation that determines the 
exchange rate of the domestic currency relative  to one of  the  two foreign 
currencies (the  other being  determined by  triangular  arbitrage).  The paper 
shows to what extent aggregate supply and demand behavior  are important 
in  determining the effects of  the  union.  Supply behavior  varies depending 
upon  whether wages respond  to prices with  a lag or are indexed to current 
changes  in  the  general  price  level, while  demand behavior is  particularly 
sensitive to price elasticities. 
The small country model has the advantage of  analytic simplicity, but by 
itself gives misleading results when foreign disturbances  are examined. The 
model  can be used to show, for example, that variations in foreign income 
due to foreign disturbances anywhere abroad unambiguously  lead to greater 
domestic output variance  in the union. But without a model of  the two for- 
eign regions, the union countries and the rest of  the world, it is difficult to 
determine  the  total  effects  of  the  underlying  foreign  disturbances,  since 
these  disturbances affect  the domestic economy through  a variety of chan- 
nels. For example, in addition to changing foreign output, a foreign demand 
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terms of trade between the foreign goods imported by the small country and 
the exchange rate between the two foreign currencies. The total effects of 
this  foreign disturbance thus may  be  quite different from the effects of  a 
change in foreign income alone. 
To study foreign disturbances, the paper introduces a model of  the two 
foreign trading regions with the same analytical structure as the small coun- 
try model. This model determines the exchange rate and terms of  trade be- 
tween  the two regions  as  well  as  the prices,  interest rates,  and  output in 
each region.  Foreign disturbances are studied first  within this  model, then 
are traced through the domestic model to determine the effects on the small 
country. 
The first section of the paper introduces the small country model, and the 
next  two  sections successively examine the effects of  disturbances within 
the one country and extended models. 
12.1 Outline of the Model 
Country 1 is a small country which has economic ties with two countries: 
country 2 is the potential partner of  country  1 in an  exchange rate  union, 
while country 3  represents the rest of  the world. Country  1 has  important 
trade and financial ties with the other two countries; the relative importance 
of  these economic ties will be an  issue in the analysis below. Country  1 is 
assumed to be  too small to influence conditions in  either foreign country. 
The two foreign countries affect country  1 through their outputs (Y,", Y;), 
the prices of their goods (P;, P:), both expressed in logarithms, and interest 
rates (r;, r3.4 
In  this three-country world,  there are three exchange rates to be  deter- 
mined. If  the franc is the currency of  country  1, the mark the currency of 
country 2, and the dollar the currency of country 3, then the three exchange 
rates are as follows (all expressed in logs): 
X: = the franc price of the dollar, 
X,"  = the mark price of  the dollar, and 
X,!'  = X: -  X,"  = the franc price of  the mark. 
Figure  12.1 illustrates the  relationships among the  three  currencies. X," is 
exogenously determined for country  1, while a second exchange rate is de- 
termined by  triangular arbitrage. 
3. The  two foreign  countries could represent  blocs of  countries with  fixed exchange  rates 
within  each  bloc,  in  which  case  country  1  does  not  need  to  be small  relative to  individual 
countries in  each  bloc. Country  2, for  example, might represent  a group of  countries in  an 
existing union (e.g., the  European Monetary  System) and country 3 represent a second group 
of  countries tied to the dollar. 
4. A list of  variables in  provided in Appendix  1. 410  Richard C. Marston 
Fig. 12.1  Currencies and exchange rates.  Country  1  = domestic country; 
country  2  = potential partner  (or partners) in  union; country  3 
= rest of  world. 
12.1.1 Demand Behavior 
Unless purchasing power parity is assumed, demand behavior in a country 
trading with  two other countries is inherently complicated. Three national 
prices are involved as well as at least two exchange rates. I begin by  defin- 
ing the prices of  the three countries’ goods expressed in francs: 
Pi  = the price of  country 1’s good, 
P:  + X; = the price of  country 3’s good in francs, and 
P:  + X:’  = the price of  country 2’s good in francs. 
It is convenient for later analysis to measure country 2’s prices relative to 
country  3. Define the terms of  trade between  countries 2 and  3  as  T, = 
P:  - (P: + X:). Then the price of country 2’s good in francs can be written 
as P,’  + T, + Xl. The general price level in country 1 can be expressed as 
a weighted average of  the prices of  the three goods: 
1:  = a&  + al,(P:  + T, + x;)  + Ul,(P,’  + x;), 
where a,, is the expenditure weight for country j’s good.5 
There are two relative prices affecting demand in country 1, the price of 
country  1’s good  relative to  each of  the  foreign goods.  The  demand  for 
domestic output can be expressed as a function of these relative prices, out- 
put  in the two foreign countries, the real rate of  interest, and a stochastic 
factor with a mean of  zero and serially uncorrelated:6 
5. When  expressed  in  levels,  this  price  index  has a geometric  form with  weights  (I],  + 
a,* + all =  1. 
6. In Appendix 2 this demand function is derived from a more  standard demand function, 
and the coefficients, g,,, and g,,,  are expressed in terms of conventional income and price elas- 
ticities. 411  Exchange Rate Unions as an Alternative to Flexible Rates 
A rise in foreign prices relative to the domestic price is assumed to increase 
aggregate demand, as is  a rise in foreign output. A rise in  the real interest 
rate is assumed to reduce aggregate demand.7 In the case of  perfect substi- 
tution between foreign and domestic goods, where either gpj becomes infi- 
nite in  size, the aggregate demand equation reduces to the familiar purchas- 
ing power panty relationship. 
12.1.2  Supply Behavior 
Supply behavior is based on  a labor contract lag of one period with the 
partial or complete indexation of  wages to current prices. Supply behavior 
is more complicated than in  a closed economy because there are two prices 
important for supply decisions, the price of  domestic output (P:)  and the 
general price level  (I:>. Output is responsive to nominal wages relative to 
the price of  domestic output,  but  nominal wages may  be  at least partially 
indexed to current changes in the general price level. 
The supply equation (2) is derived from a Cobb-Douglas production func- 
tion (2a), a labor market equilibrium condition (2b) determining the contract 
wage, W:‘, and a wage indexation equation (2c): 
(2)  Y; = c(P: - ,-&)  - 
(2a) 
-  ,-‘El:) + co 
Y: = (1 - c’)L: = -c(w:  -  P:) + c 1n(1 - c’) 
w:  = w:’  + b(l: -  r-lEI:), 
(2b) 
(2c) 
W:’  = ,-lEP:  + h(l - c‘) - c’L’ 
where c  = (1 - c’)/c‘  and co = (1 - c’)L’.  The contract wage, reflecting 
expectations at time  t  - 1, is  based  on  labor demand  (derived from the 
production function) and an inelastic labor supply  The actual wage, 
W:, will  differ  from  the contract wage  if  the  indexation  parameter,  b, is 
different from  zero; this  parameter is  assumed  to  vary  between  zero  (no 
7. ,El,!+, is  country  1’s  general  price  level  for period  f  +  1  expected  at  period  r,  so 
(,Ef:+,  - 1:) is  the  expected  change in  that  price  level.  ,El,!+, is  assumed  to  be  formed 
rationally from the rest of  the model, as are all other expectations in  the model. 
8. The desired labor supply is inelastic,  but once the contract is signed the amount of  labor 
supplied is determined  by  the demand for labor as in Gray (1976). The desired labor supply, 
alternatively,  might be  sensitive to nominal wages relative to the general price level.  None of 
the results below would be affected by  this change in  specification, since current output would 
be  a  function  of the  same price  prediction  errors as in  (2). When  labor  supply  is  variable, 
however, an alternative objective function measuring deviations of output from desired output 
is no longer equivalent to our objective function. (See section  12.2 below.) 412  Richard C. Marston 
indexation)  and  one (full  indexation).'  With  no  indexation,  only  domestic 
price prediction errors matter, but with partial or full indexation,  price pre- 
diction errors in  the general price index also matter.  With  full  indexation, 
in fact, equal increases in P: and 1:  leave supply unaffected.  When indexa- 
tion  is  less than  complete, however, equal  increases in P,'  and I:  increase 
supply since the real wages faced by producers fall. 
12.1.3 Financial Behavior 
The three countries have two financial assets each: money and bonds (the 
latter bearing interest rate ri). To keep the financial sector simple, however, 
the three bonds  are assumed to be perfect  substitutes so that their expected 
returns expressed in the same currency are equal:" 
r,'  = r:  + (,EX:+, - x:), 
r:  = r:  + (,EX:+, -  x?). 
The demand  for  money  is  expressed  as  a  function  of  real  income,  with 
money  balances  and  income  being  deflated  by  the  general  price  level, as 
well as the domestic interest rate: 
(3) 
The behavior  of  the  money  supply depends on the  exchange  rate  regime. 
Under flexible rates, the money supply is assumed to be exogenously deter- 
mined  as follows: M: = M' + uyl. The current money supply is equal to 
a base level plus a random term, where the latter has a mean of zero and is 
serially  uncorrelated  as well as uncorrelated  with  the  demand  disturbance. 
The supply of money in the exchange rate union is described below. 
12.1.4 Foreign Behavior 
All  foreign  variables  in  the  model  are  exogenously  determined  by  the 
small country assumption.  I express each foreign variable as a constant plus 
9.  For  studies  of  wage  indexation  behavior,  see  Gray  (1976), Fischer (1977). Modigliani 
and  Padoa-Schioppa  (1978), Sachs (1980) and Flood and Marion  (1982). Flood  and  Marion 
provide an  interesting analysis of  how indexation behavior  may respond  to the choice of  ex- 
change rate regime.  Because in many countries indexation behavior is governed by  institutional 
or legal constraints, however, I prefer to assume that the degree of indexation remains the same 
when the exchange  rate regime changes. Thus the analysis will show how the choice of  ex- 
change rate regime differs between countries with different types of  wage and price behavior. 
10. For a more general study of  financial behavior in an exchange rate union,  see Marston 
(1984). In that study, where the effects of  various financial disturbances are analyzed, foreign 
and domestic bonds are assumed to be  imperfect substitutes. 
11. The income  elasticity  of  the demand  for money  is  assumed  to he  one.  If  it  were  not 
equal  to one,  a change in  the  general  price  level, which  could  be  due  to  a change in  the 
exchange rate or one of the prices,  would have an effect on the net demand for money propor- 
tional to one minus this elasticity.  Note that the exchange rate can still affect the demand for 
money in this model by changing the interest rate. 413  Exchange Rate Unions as an Alternative  to  Flexible Rates 
a random  variable where  the  latter is  the  innovation in  that  variable for 
period t:I2 
r:' = 7'  + ur,  i = 2, 3. 
In  the  third part of  the paper,  the random  variables will  be  expressed in 
terms of the underlying foreign disturbances. Until then these variables are 
assumed to have zero mean, to be serially uncorrelated, and to be uncorre- 
lated with each other. 
12.1.5 Description of  the Two Exchange Rate Regimes 
The exchange rate union will be compared with a regime of  flexible ex- 
change rates  where  no  exchange market  intervention occurs.  The flexible 
regime is discussed first. 
Flexible Exchange Rates 
The basic equations of  the model, (1)-(3),  determine three domestic vari- 
ables,  Yf, Pf, and X:, as  functions of  all the  stochastic and nonstochastic 
variables (X,"  is then determined by triangular arbitrage). To facilitate com- 
parison between the two regimes, equations (1) and (2)  are first solved for 
Yf  and  Pf  as functions of  Xf  and  the  exogenous variables.  The resulting 
expressions, equations (I) and (11)  in table  12.1, describe aggregate demand 
and  supply behavior in both exchange rate  regimes.13 The stochastic vari- 
ables influencing Y,'  and Pf include the domestic aggregate demand distur- 
bance,  up',  as well  as the random components of  Xi and the foreign vari- 
able. 
Under flexible rates, the franc price of the dollar, Xf ,  can be expressed as 
a function of exogenous variables alone by  solving all three equations, (1)- 
(3), for the reduced form. Equation (Ma) in table 12.1 presents the expres- 
sion for x:. 
12. fl  is the innovation  in  Pi, u:'  = Pi - ,-,EP;, and similarly for other variables.  The 
underlying foreign disturbances  have a mean of  zero and are serially uncorrelated,  so the ex- 
pected  value  of  each variable  is  equal  to  its value  in  a stationary equilibrium;  for example, 
,-,EP:-=  c.  (See section 12.3 below.) 
13.  Y',  P'  are the solutions for Y: and P: when the disturbances in equations  (I) and (2) are 
equal to zero. To obtain the coefficients of  u:  in table  12.1, I have assumed that the shares of 
the two foreign goods in the price indexes are proportional to the respective price elasticities in 
the aggregate  demand equation:  alz/aI3  =  gpz/gp,. This restriction  allows trade  to be  biased 
toward one foreign country or the other (see below), but the bias must be equally reflected in 
the al,'s and g,,'s. Table 12.1  Country  1's  Model 415 
Exchange Rate Union 
If country  1 joins an exchange rate union  with  country  2, the monetary 
authorities  must  intervene  in  the  exchange market  to  ensure  that  X,"  = 
X: -  X: remains constant.  For convenience I assume that the franc price of 
the mark is initially equal to one (so that the log of this exchange rate, X:', 
is  initially  equal to zero).  In that case, intervention  keeps X,'  = X:  at all 
times.  Suppose that the foreign intervention is carried out by the monetary 
authority of country  1 which  buys  (or sells) country 2's  currency and sells 
(or buys) country  1's currency to keep X,"  fixed.  (The results  would be the 
same if country 2 camed out this inter~ention.)'~  In that case, equation (3) 
describing money  market equilibrium  simply determines the money supply 
consistent with keeping X: equal to X:. In place of  equation (IIIa) determin- 
ing X: on the basis of  country  1's  behavior,  I have an exogenously  deter- 
mined exchange rate, X:  = X:  =  + $2.  By joining the union, country 
1 has not only fixed its mark exchange rate but has effectively surrendered 
control over its dollar exchange rate. 
Two other characteristics  of  this  regime  should be pointed  out. First, I 
assume that the private sector is fully confident that the union  is permanent 
in the sense that the authorities will be able to maintain the fixed exchange 
rate between the franc and the mark.  Thus J? X::'  = X,".  Since I abstract 
from inflation and other secular trends, this assumption is not an unrealistic 
one. But in adopting it, I ignore some interesting problems associated with 
actual  unions  such  as the  European  Monetary  System  where  expectations 
about changes in pegs are important.  Second, I ignore any changes  in  pri- 
vate behavior which the formation of the union might induce. Cooper (1976) 
and  others  have  pointed  out that  a change  in  exchange  rate  arrangements 
might lead to changes in trade and financial behavior affecting the parame- 
ters  of  the behavioral  functions.  While recognizing  the  importance of  this 
point, I follow previous writers in assuming that these parameters are invar- 
iant  to  the  regime  since otherwise  I  would  need  to model  explicitly  the 
microeconomic behavior of trading firms and investors.  l5 
Exchange Rate Unions as an  Alternative to Flexible Rates 
12.2 Evaluation of the Union: Domestic Disturbances 
The two domestic  disturbances  in  the  model,  u;'  and  uyl, need  further 
discussion.  Following  Mundell (1  963) and other studies of  internal-external 
balance,  I  might  view  these  factors as deliberate  instruments of  fiscal  and 
14.  The choice of  which country  to intervene would be  important if  the intervention took 
the form of buying or selling foreign bonds (as would be  the case if  the foreign currency were 
used  as a reserve currency), but here I assume a simple form of  intervention with no steriliza- 
tion of  the intervention effects.  For an  analysis of  different types of  intervention policy,  see 
Marston (1980). 
15. One study which does take into account changes in behavior is that by Flood and Marion 
(1982), which allows wage indexation to vary  with the regime. 416  Richard C. Marston 
monetary  policy, respectively,  in which  case the objective naturally  would 
be to maximize their impact on the economy.  l6 Given the stochastic assump- 
tions  adopted  in  this paper, these policies  would  have to be  unanticipated 
and temporary.  (See Marston, [  19831 for a discussion of stabilization policy 
in stochastic models.) I prefer to view up1 and u:'  as economic disturbances 
originating  in  private  sector  behavior,  however, and  to regard  the  task  of 
policy to minimize the effects of these disturbances. 
To  judge the desirability of an exchange rate union, I also need to specify 
which macroeconomic variables I am interested  in  stabilizing, since a union 
modifies  the  impact  of  disturbances  on most  macroeconomic  variables  in 
country  1. Although I discuss the response of other variables such as prices, 
1 follow the traditional literature on the choice between regimes by focusing 
on  one variable  only, domestic  output.  More  specifically,  the  choice  be- 
tween  flexible rates and the exchange rate union is based  on which regime' 
minimizes the effects of economic disturbances on the variance of domestic 
Most  of  the  analysis  below  follows  closely  that  of  a country  choosing 
between  fixed  and flexible rates.  That is because  country  1's  disturbances 
have no effect on the exchange rate between the mark and the dollar, so that 
in a union  country  1 is affected by the disturbances just as if  it had a fixed 
exchange rate with the dollar as well as the mark. The analysis departs from 
the  traditional  literature  on  fixed  and  flexible  rates,  however,  in  showing 
how  wage  indexation  modifies  the  effects  of  monetary  and  aggregate  de- 
mand disturbances,  This will be important in the discussion of  foreign dis- 
turbances to follow. 
I  begin  by  examining  the  effects  of  the  disturbances  in  the  case  where 
there is  no wage  indexation  in the domestic  economy, then  I consider the 
effects  of  indexation.  For  convenience, 1 present  below  the  equations  for 
domestic output and the exchange rate (equations [I] and [IIIa] of table 12.1) 




16. For an analysis of fiscal and monetary policies in a union context, see Allen and Kenen 
(1980, chaps.  15-18),  who study the effects of the policies in an exchange rate union as well 
as in a full-fledged monetary union where there is a single central bank. 
17.  Following  Gray  (1976), we  might  measure  domestic  output  relative  to  desired  rather 
than  expected  output,  where  the  former  is  defined as that  output  which  would  prevail  in  a 
frictionless  economy without  contract  lags.  As  long  as labor  supply  is  inelastic,  these  two 
objectives are equivalent since desired output, like expected output, is unaffected by  the distur- 
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In the  exchange rate  union, 4’ is equal to zero because X: is tied  to the 
exogenously  determined  mark,  while  under  flexible  rates  u:’  can be  ex- 
pressed as in equation (5) in terms of  both domestic disturbances. 
Consider first the effects of a monetary disturbance.  A monetary  distur- 
bance has no effect on output in  an exchange rate union.  An expansion of 
the  money  supply, for example, leads  to pressure  on both  franc exchange 
rates,  but intervention  in  the exchange market ensures that X:  = X:  where 
the  latter is exogenously  determined.  The disturbance  simply results  in  an 
equal and offsetting capital flow.18 In a flexible regime,  in contrast, a mon- 
etary expansion leads to a depreciation of the franc and an increase in out- 
put,  at least when there is no indexation.”  Thus, as in  the case where only 
one foreign country is involved (see, for example, Mundell [  1963]), domes- 
tic  monetary  disturbances  cause  variations  in  output  only  under  flexible 
rates. 
An  aggregate  demand  disturbance  in  country  1,  in  contrast,  leads  to 
greater changes in output in an exchange rate union.  An increase in aggre- 
gate  demand  raises  domestic  output and prices.  There is  pressure  on both 
franc exchange rates  because  of  the  incipient  rise  in  the  domestic  interest 
rate, but once again intervention in the exchange market ensures that X: = 
X:.  Under flexible exchange rates, however,  the increase in output leads to 
an appreciation  of the domestic currency  (X: and X:’ fall) which  dampens 
the overall increase in aggregate demand.”  Thus there is less output varia- 
tion under flexible rates. 
When  indexation  is  complete  (b =  l), however,  these  familiar  results 
break  down. To understand  why  this  is  true,  notice that  the effect  of  the 
exchange rate on domestic  output is dependent on the degree of  indexation 
in  the  domestic  economy. As equation  (4) indicates,  the effect  is  propor- 
tional  to c(1 - b), with  full  indexation  (b =  1)  preventing  the exchange 
rate from affecting domestic output at all. For that reason, the difference in 
18. If  country  I  were not small, its dollar exchange rate could change because the monetary 
expansion  together  with  the accompanying  foreign exchange  intervention would also  signifi- 
cantly affect the money supply in country 2. 
19. The monetary disturbance affects output only through the exchange rate, as equation (4) 
indicates.  The exchange  rate  depreciates,  u:’  = Xj  - x’  > 0, so output  increases  under 
flexible rates. 
20.  Under flexible rates, the direct (positive) impact of u:“  on Yj in  equation (4) is modified 
by  the decline in  (which reduces Yj).  Output nonetheless increases even under flexible rates. 
In  contrast, Mundell’s (1961) study of  fixed  and  flexible  rates  showed  that  output  did  not 
increase at  all  in  response  to a demand disturbance (in his study, an  increase in  government 
spending); given his  assumption  that exchange  rate expectations  were static, only a constant 
output was consistent with money market equilibrium.  In  this study, the exchange rate appre- 
ciates relative to the expected exchange rate, with the domestic interest rate rising accordingly; 
so output can increase despite a constant money supply. 418  Richard C. Marston 
output variation between the two regimes must be proportional to c(1 - b). 
And with full indexation,  each disturbance must have an identical  effect on 
output  in  the two regimes.  These  results  can be  illustrated  in  figures  12.2 
and  12.3, which show how aggregate demand and supply adjust to the dis- 
turbances when indexation is complete. 
First consider the monetary disturbance. Under flexible rates, the resulting 
depreciation leads to an outward shift in the aggregate demand function (to 
point B in fig.  12.2) because of the sensitivity of aggregate demand to rela- 
tive prices  and the real  interest rate.  When  wages are fully indexed to the 
general price level, however, there is a corresponding leftward shift in ag- 
gregate  supply  (to point C)  because  the  depreciation  leads to a rise  in the 
nominal  wage.  The price  of  domestic  output  accordingly  rises  further;  in 
fact, the price of domestic output and the exchange rate increase by the same 
amount, with the constant terms of  trade ensuring that output remains fixed 
at its original  level.*'  In  the  union, in contrast,  no depreciation  occurs, so 
the aggregate supply and demand curves remain at point A. With full index- 
ation of wages, therefore, the monetary disturbance leaves output unaffected 
in  both  regimes.  The  two  regimes  differ  with  respect  to  price  behavior, 
however, since prices increase only under flexible rates. 
The  aggregate  demand  disturbance  does  change  real  output  in  both  re- 
gimes.  In the union, the demand disturbance shifts equilibrium to point A' 
in  figure  12.3. Under  flexible  rates,  the  increase  in  demand  leads  to  an 
appreciation of the franc and to a smaller increase in aggregate demand than 
P! 
Fig. 12.2  Domestic monetary disturbance. 
21.  Sachs (1980) and Flood and Marion (1982) also discuss the case of  full wage indexation. 
In the model specified by Sachs, constant terms of trade ensure that the disturbance has no net 
effect  on  aggregate  demand. In  the  present  model,  aggregate  demand  is  also  a function  of 
expectations  through the real  interest rate.  But because the expected change  in  the exchange 
rate is equal to the expected change in the domestic price as well as in the general price level, 
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Fig. 12.3  Domestic aggregate demand disturbance 
in the union (to point B’).  With complete indexation of wages, however, the 
appreciation of the exchange rate also raises aggregate supply by  lowering 
real  wages  faced by  producers.  Point  C‘ is  reached  where  the  change  in 
output  is  the  same as  in  the  union.  Thus,  as  in  the  case  of  a  monetary 
disturbance, full indexation results in the same variance of output in the two 
regimes. In both cases, indexation ensures that the shift in aggregate demand 
due to the exchange rate is matched by an offsetting shift in aggregate sup- 
ply, so that the exchange rate has no net effect on domestic output. 
In the absence of indexation, exchange rate flexibility is preferred  in  the 
case of the aggregate demand disturbance, but the union is preferred in  the 
case of  the monetary  disturbance. The effect of wage indexation is to blur 
these  differences,  with  full  indexation  eliminating  the  advantages  or dis- 
advantages of flexibility in stabilizing output. 
12.3 Evaluation of the Union: Foreign Disturbances 
Foreign  disturbances  affect the  domestic economy through  a variety  of 
channels: (a)  Changes in  foreign output directly affect domestic aggregate 
demand (proportionally to  gy2 and gy3).  (6) Changes in  foreign prices or in 
the foreign  terms of  trade  induce substitution  with the domestic good (de- 
pending  on the price elasticities, gp2 and gp3).  (c)  In the union, changes in 
the mark price of  the dollar affect aggregate demand  (through those same 
price  elasticities).  (d) Foreign  interest  rates  affect  domestic  demand  in- 
directly by  changing the franc price  of  the  dollar under  flexible rates  and 
directly through the real interest rate effect on aggregate demand. 
All  of  these  channels  are potentially  important.  For many disturbances, 
moreover, country 1’s output is pushed in contrary directions. The net effect 
of foreign disturbances on country  1 depends upon which of these channels 
are most important. That, in turn, depends on the types of economic distur- 420  Richard C. Marston 
bances encountered as well as on the pattern of trade. One might expect the 
union to be more desirable if economic disturbances predominantly originate 
from outside the union  and if the pattern of trade is biased so that country  1 
trades primarily with country 2. Both of  these propositions will be explored 
in the analysis below. 
In order to investigate  foreign economic  disturbances,  I  need  to specify 
models of the two foreign countries.  To keep the models relatively  simple, 
1 adopt the following assumptions: 
1. Countries  2  and  3  have  identical  economic  structures.  That  is,  the 
structural parameters  in the aggregate supply and demand equations and in 
the financial equations are the same for the two countries. Thus I can specify 
one national  model  which  can apply to both  countries.”  This  assumption 
does not restrict the nature of country  1’s relationships with the two foreign 
countries since any asymmetries in country  1’s links with the foreign coun- 
tries could not  affect the  latter given  the  small country  assumption.  More 
specifically, country  1 may choose to trade  with one country more than the 
other or may be more sensitive to one country’s prices or output. 
2.  For most of the discussion below,  there is complete  wage  indexation 
in both  foreign countries  so that equal increases in domestic prices  and ex- 
change rates (or foreign prices) leave aggregate supply unaffected.  Foreign 
output is then  solely a function of  the terms of trade. This assumption con- 
siderably simplifies the analysis of  the two foreign countries,  making it eas- 
ier to show the channels through  which  foreign  disturbances affect country 
1. Even  with  the  simplifying  assumption,  some  of  the  effects  of  foreign 
disturbances  are ambiguous, but  I  am able to distinguish clearly which fac- 
tors are important in determining the net impact of the disturbances. 
Later  in  this  section  I  relax  the  assumption  about  foreign  indexation  to 
consider the opposite case of no wage  indexation  abroad. The contrast be- 
tween the two cases is interesting,  since it shows once again how wage and 
price adjustments  affect the relative performance  of  different exchange rate 
regimes. 
12.3.1 The Foreign Country Model 
The model closely parallels that specified for country  1. Differences arise 
primarily because only two countries are involved,  given the small country 
assumption for country  1, and because the aggregate supply equation takes 
a simple form when  wage indexation is complete.  Each national  model can 
be expressed  in three equations (where i  = 2, 3, j  #  1): 
22. The countries’ price indices, for example, are mirror images of  one another; the weight 
of each country’s own good in  its price index is the same for both countries, u2* = uj3 = a. 
Note that country  1’s prices and output are assumed to have a negligible impact on the foreign 
countries; for example, uzL  and a,,, the weights of  country 1’s good in the foreign price indices, 
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(1)'  r, = $0 - gf,Z + dy: -  g9r: 
- (IEZ+  1  -  I:>] + UB', 
(2)'  Y: = C/O  + ~'(1  -  u)(T: -  t-lETi), 
M' + u:'  -  I:  = [P:  + Y: -  I:] - klr: + b,  (3)' 
where  =  TI =  P; - (P: +  X;),  T:  =  -T,,  I:  =  UP:  + 
(1 -  a)(P: + X:), and I;'  = UP: + (1 - a)(P: -  X:). Aggregate demand 
is a function of  the terms of  trade,  T,, foreign output, and the real interest 
rate as well as a disturbance term, uf. Aggregate supply is a simple function 
of  the terms of  trade.  Money demand and  supply in the foreign countries 
are assumed to be identical in form to those of  country 1.23 
The two-country model is naturally complex, but one can analyze its be- 
havior relatively easily by focusing on two variables, the terms of  trade of 
country 2 and the price of  country 3's good.24  The remaining variables can 
then be expressed in terms of these two. 
The terms of  trade of  country 2, defined as T, = P; - (P: + X:), can 
be expressed as a function of the two aggregate demand disturbances, uf2 
and up: 
(up'  -  u:") 
Tl=T+ 
(N' -  N2) 
A rise in  aggregate demand in  country 3  lowers the terms of  trade  (since 
N'  - N2 < 0), while a rise in  aggregate demand in  country 2  raises the 
terms of  trade,  With full indexation, monetary disturbances have no effect 
on the terms of trade. 
The  price  of  country  3's  good  is  a  function of  the  aggregate demand 
disturbances as well as the monetary disturbance in country 3: 
kl  (N'U? -  N2~t3]  4' 
g:(l  + kl)  (N' -  N2)  (1 + kl). 
P?=P+  + 
A rise in aggregate demand in either country increases the price of  country 
3's good (as well as of  country 2's  good), while an increase in country 3's 
money supply also raises this price. 
23.  In particular,  I assume that the interest elasticities of  the money demand functions are 
the same as those in country  1. The disturbance terms, u:  and uy,  are assumed to have mean 
zero and to be serially uncorrelated. 
24.  The price of country 2's good, alternatively, could have been singled out since the model 
is symmetric with respect to the two countries. Recall, however, that in country  1's model, the 
foreign prices were defined relative to country 3's price. 
25.  The real interest rate effect on aggregate demand is assumed to be small enough so that 
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Output in either country is a function of  the terms of  trade as shown in 
equation (2’). Note  that  a rise in the terms of  trade increases country 2’s 
output  (because it reduces  the  real  wage  faced  by  its  producers) but  de- 
creases country 3’s output.  In  fact, the increase in country 2’s output and 
decrease in country 3’s output are equal in size. 
The two remaining foreign variables appearing explicitly in country  1’s 
model,  r:  and X;, can be expressed in  terms of  P:, T,, and the monetary 
disturbance by  solving the money market equilibrium conditions: 
2-2  x,=x - 
- 
T) +  (24:’  - 
Monetary disturbances naturally affect both nominal variables, although an 
equal increase in both  money  supplies leaves the mark  price of  the dollar 
unaffected since there are no asymmetries between the two economies. An 
aggregate demand disturbance affects both  variables by  changing the terms 
of trade and, in the case of the interest rate, by  changing country 3’s price. 
12.3.2 Foreign Monetary Disturbances 
This section shows exchange rate unions in their most unfavorable light. 
That  is  because flexible  exchange rates  are  so effective in  insulating the 
domestic economy from foreign monetary disturbances, at least when  for- 
eign wages  are fully indexed.  Under flexible rates,  monetary disturbances 
originating abroad have no effect on output or prices in country  1. This is 
true regardless of  the degree of wage indexation in country 1; what matters 
is that the foreign countries be fully indexed. 
Consider first what I term general monetary expansions, disturbances that 
are perfectly correlated and of  the same magnitude in  the two foreign coun- 
tries: uy2 = 147’ = uy > 0. These disturbances raise the price of  country 
have no effect on foreign output as long as the foreign countries are fully 
indexed. The interest rate  in country 3 (or country 2) falls by  u:’  = r,’ - 
r3  =  -uy/(l  + kl), the same absolute amount by  which uf3 rises. 
As far as country 1 is concerned, what matters under flexible rates are the 
franc prices of  the two foreign goods and the franc return on the dollar (or 
mark) security, since these are the only variables that can affect country 1’s 
aggregate demand or supply. By  consolidating price terms, 1 can write coun- 
try  1’s output as a function of these variables: 
3’s good  (and country 2’s  good) by  uy3 = P3 - P3 = $/(I  +  k,) but 423 
The foreign prices expressed in francs and the franc return both remain con- 
stant under flexible rates since the franc price of the dollar (and of the mark) 
falls by  u:’  = X: - x’  =  -uT3/(l  + kl), thereby completely insulating 
country  1 from the disturbance. 
Insulation also occurs with respect to any other foreign  monetary  distur- 
bances  under flexible  rates, whether the disturbances  are negatively corre- 
lated,  for example, or concentrated  in one of the two countries (two types 
of  disturbances  considered  below).  The key  to this  result  lies  in  the  full 
indexation assumption, but as noted above, it is full indexation abroad rather 
than in country  1 that insulates the latter. 
In an exchange rate union, a monetary  disturbance in country 3 still has 
no effect on  country  1. Flexibility  in  the  mark  price  of  the dollar, which 
falls by 4’  = -  uY3/(  1 + kl),  simply replaces the franc price of  the dollar 
as the insulating factor (with the franc tied to the mark). 
If  the monetary  disturbance  is in country  2, however, then  in the union 
the fixed exchange rate with that country’s currency ensures that the distur- 
bance is transmitted to country  1. Consider first the effects of the monetary 
expansion on the two foreign countries.  The price of country 2’s good rises 
while its interest rate falls: 42  = uT2/(1 + kl) = -  u:~.  The mark price of 
the  dollar rises  enough so  that country  3 is unaffected  by the disturbance: 
4’  = uT2/(1 + kl); that is, country 3’s price and interest rate as well as its 
output remain fixed. 
In  terms of  the  franc, country  1’s currency,  the  prices  of  both  foreign 
goods rise in the union: the franc price of country 2’s good rises because its 
mark  price rises, and the  franc price of country 3’s good  rises  because  of 
the  depreciation  of  the  mark  (and  hence  the  franc)  relative  to  the  dollar: 
ur2 = 43  + 4’ = uy2/(1 + k,).  In addition, country  1’s interest rate falls. 
So output in country  1 rises.26 Thus, if there is a union between countries  1 
and  2,  monetary  disturbances  originating  in  country  2  are  transmitted  to 
country  1. 
With full indexation abroad, flexible rates have a clear advantage over the 
union  in  shielding  the  domestic  economy  from  foreign  monetary  distur- 
bances.  Later  in  the  paper  1 consider  these  same disturbances  under  the 
assumption of  no indexation.  Flexible  rates  will  still generally be  superior 
to the  union, but  country  1 will  not  always be insulated  from  the  distur- 
bances. 
12.3.3 Aggregate Demand Disturbances 
Demand disturbances generally do affect country  1’s output under flexible 
exchange rates  as  well  as in  the  union.  How  a  country  fares  in  the  two 
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26. Country  1’s interest  rate falls because with a fixed rate between the  franc  and mark, r: 
must decline with r:. Only if  there is full wage indexation in  country  1 does this purely nominal 
disturbance  leave  country  1’s  output  unaffected in  the  union.  (This can be  shown  by solving 
equation [6] for u:’  and  simplifying.) The  flexibility of  wages and  prices then  makes up for 
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regimes depends on  the  specific form which  the  disturbances take.  I  will 
consider three types of demand disturbances because they all provide insight 
into the effects of the union: 
1. Negatively correlated disturbances representing a shift in demand from 
the products of country 3 to those of country 2. The shift in demand affects 
country  1 primarily by  changing the terms of  trade and shifting output (and 
hence  demand  for  country  1’s  products)  from  one  foreign  country  to 
another. This type of  disturbance serves to illustrate the importance of  the 
pattern of trade between country  1  and the other countries. 
2. Positively correlated disturbances which have the same magnitude in 
both countries, representing a general increase in foreign demand. Since the 
increase in  demand  is  of  the  same  magnitude  in  both  foreign  countries, 
Country  1  responds as  if  it  were  trading with  one  foreign country under 
flexible and fixed exchange rates, respectively. 
3.  An increase in demand which is concentrated in one country more than 
the other,  a third  case combining the first two to show the importance of 
where the disturbance occurs. 
All of these disturbances have the effect of changing interest rates abroad. 
If  the real  interest  rate  effect on  aggregate demand  in  country  1  is  large 
enough,  however,  eveq  a general expansion of  demand  abroad  will  have 
ambiguous effects on country  1’s output since the resulting rise in  foreign 
interest rates runs counter to other effects on the foreign demand expansion. 
To avoid  this  additional ambiguity,  I  assume in  this  section that  the real 
interest rate  effect in  country  1  is zero  (gr = 0). Under this  assumption, 
higher foreign interest rates can still have a significant effect on country 1’s 
output, but indirectly by  changing exchange rates. 
Negatively Correlated Aggregate Demand Disturbances 
Suppose that there is a shift in demand to country 2’s products from those 
-vf, vf > 0.  Then the terms of  trade of  of country 3 with u$  = v, ,  u,-  - 
country 2 rise by  ur = T, - T  =  -2 vf/(N’ -  N2) > 0. Output rises in 
country 2 and falls in country 3 proportionately to the change in the terms 
of trade. Interest rates rise in country 2 but fall in country 3; as a result, the 
mark appreciates by 
d  d3 - 
Since the two foreign economies are identical, this shift disturbance moves 
each economy in equal but opposite directions. 
With  the two  foreign countries responding symmetrically to  the  distur- 
bance,  the effect on country  1  clearly depends on its pattern of  trade with 
the two countries. The expression for Y: in  table  12.1  can be rewritten as a 
function of the terms of trade and the exchange rates in a form which shows 
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(7)  Y: - 
+ 
u:‘ 
As  in  table  12.1, this  expression  holds  for  either exchange rate  regime. 
Under flexible rates, the franc price of the dollar is given by 
-  k7,2  -  gp3”  + 41  - b)l  + (a12 - a13)cb) g 
D  2’ 
In these equations, the aggregate demand coefficients, g,,  and g,,,  and price 
index weights, a],,  all reflect the pattern of  trade between country 1 and the 
two foreign countries. 
Just what is meant by the pattern of trade in this model? I have chosen a 
definition based  on  the  share  of  country  1’s trade with  each of  the  two 
foreign countries. The price index weight, all,  reflects the share of  country 
1’s imports from country i expressed as a fraction of  domestic expenditure. 
Similarly, as Appendix 2 shows, the aggregate demand coefficients, gy, and 
gpl, reflect the share of country 1’s exports to country i (as well as the share 
of  imports from country  i since trade is  assumed to be balanced  initially) 
expressed as  a fraction  of  domestic output.  The  income  coefficients also 
depend on the income elasticities of  demand for country 1’s good in the two 
foreign countries,  while the  price coefficients also depend  on  export and 
import price elasticities. 1  assume that these elasticities are the same for both 
foreign countries so that  differences  in the aggregate demand  coefficients 
solely reflect the share of  trade.”  Alternatively, I could interpret the results 
obtained below in terms of  the elasticities themselves. Country  1  might be 
particularly sensitive to  aggregate demand expansions in country 2, for ex- 
ample, not because its trade is biased toward country 2, but because country 
2’s demand for its product has a relatively high  income or price elasticity. 
The  reader  might  wish  to  keep  this  alternative  interpretation  in  mind, 
although I will confine this discussion to trade shares alone. 
I begin by  considering the neutral case where country 1’s trade is evenly 
balanced  between  country  2  and  country 3, so that  the  output and  price 
elasticities in  equation (7) and (8) are equal,  gy2 = gy3 and  gp2 = gp3, as 
well as the weights in the general price index, aI2  = ~13.  In this case, the 
shift in demand has no effect on country 1’s output under flexible rates. The 
27.  I  assume, for example, that  hz  = h3, so that  gvzlgv3  IS proportional  to  (EX2/Q1)I(EX3/ 
Q’),  where EX’ denotes the exports of  country  1  to  country  i and Q’  the output of country  1. 
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foreign output term in equation (7) is equal to zero. That is, the change in 
the terms of  trade raises country 2’s output and  lowers country 3’s output 
by  the same amount, so the shift in demand has no direct output effect on 
country  1’s aggregate demand. In addition, the franc appreciates by  exactly 
one-half  as much  as  the  mark  relative  to the  dollar: 4’ =  42/2. So the 
franc prices of  goods from the two countries move  in  equal and  opposite 
directions as follows: 
country 3’s good: up3 + u:’  = - uri2, 
country 2’s good: up’  + u:’  + ut  = 412. 
This  change in  relative prices  also has  opposing effects on  aggregate de- 
mand. So country 1’s output is insulated from the disturbance. The insula- 
tion  occurs because country  1  can  take  advantage of  its  diversified trade 
pattern,  with  one foreign country’s contraction offset by  another country’s 
expansion.28 The advantage is not confined to demand disturbances, as we 
shall see below;  it  is  the negative correlation between  the  foreign  distur- 
bances which is important. 
Under flexible rates, as noted above, the franc appreciates relative to the 
dollar; with  balanced trade,  the franc appreciates one-half  as  much  as  the 
mark.  (Recall that  the shift in  demand toward  country  2’s products raises 
country 2’s  interest rate and  lowers country 3’s interest  rate  by  the  same 
absolute amount.) In the union, the franc is tied to the mark, so it appreci- 
ates more than under flexible rates (i.e., twice as much). The franc prices 
of  both foreign goods fall, so output in country 1 must fall in the union.29 
For similar reasons, country 1 fares better under flexible rates when trade 
is biased  toward country 3 (gy3  > gy2,  gp3 > gp2). In  that case, the direct 
effect of  the shift in foreign output is to reduce country  1’s aggregate de- 
mand since the output of  its closest trading partner, country 3, drops. Since 
the appreciation of the franc in the union is greater than under flexible rates, 
country  1’s output falls even further in the union than under flexible rates.30 
The greater appreciation associated with the union  adds to the deflationary 
effects of  the shift in demand. 
If  country  1’s trade is biased  toward country 2  (gy2 > gy3, gp2 > gp3), 
which  may be the more likely case for a country joining a union, then the 
TT 
28. If  country  1 produced a variety of  goods, the negative correlation between disturbances 
would not necessarily prevent individual industries in country  1 from expanding or contracting 
if they were more sensitive to one foreign country’s behavior than another’s. 
29.  In  the union, the franc price of country 3’s good must fall because of  the appreciation 
of the franc. The franc price of country 2’s good also falls as long as 
is negative,  which it will be assuming that c’(  1 - a) > k,/2. 
d’ - d2/2  > o in  equation (7). 
30.  Note that  it can be shown that country  1’s output falls under flexible rates even though 427  Exchange Rate Unions as an Alternative to Flexible Rates 
direct output effect is positive. That is, the shift in output toward country 2 
tends to raise country 1  ’s output. Now a greater appreciation of the franc in 
the union than under flexible rates may help to stabilize country 1’s 
So the union may be superior to flexible rates when trade is biased toward 
country 2. If the price elasticities (gpj’s) are large enough so that the price 
effects in equation (7) dominate the output effect, however, then once again 
the  greater  appreciation of  the  franc  in  the  union  becomes  a  drawback. 
Country  1’s output then varies more in the union than under flexible rates.32 
Positively Correlated Disturbances (General lncreuse in Demand) 
There is no longer the same presumption in favor of  flexible rates when 
the demand disturbance is a general one, u$  = 4’  = u;.  Flexible rates are 
superior to the union only when price elasticities are high. 
If demand increases (or decreases) by the same amount in both countries, 
there is no change in the terms of  trade nor in the mark price of the dollar. 
Since foreign output is  a function of  the real  wage,  which  is  constant as 
long  as the terms of  trade remain  fixed, output in  both  countries is  con- 
~tant.~~  So  this demand disturbance has effects only on nominal quantities. 
Prices in both foreign countries rise: 
Similarly,  both rates of interest  rise  (proportionally to  the  prices):  uF3  = 
~4’~/k~  = u;’.  The change in output in country  I  can be written 
(9) 
where as before u:’  depends on the exchange rate regime. 
In the exchange rate union, there is no change in the franc price of  the 
dollar since the mark  price of  the  dollar is fixed.  But  the rise  in foreign 
prices increase output in country 1 with the increase proportional to the price 
elasticities, gp2  + gp3. 
Under  flexible  rates  as  well,  country  1’s  output  is  increased  because 
4’  +  M;’  > 0.  Whether output is  increased  more or  less  under  flexible 
rates,  however,  depends on whether  the  franc appreciates or depreciates. 
The franc price of  the dollar can be written 
31.  Since the  franc  prices of  both  foreign goods  fall  in  the  union,  the  price  effects run 
counter to the output effect. One may neutralize the other, thus helping to stabilize country  1’s 
output. 
32.  In  equation (7).  the price terms increase in (absolute) value relative to the foreign output 
term  as the price elasticities (gpz,  gp3)  increase. 
33.  If  indexation were  less  than  complete  in  the  foreign countries,  this  type  of  demand 
disturbance would lead to  increases in  output as well as prices, with the relative importance of 
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To interpret this equation, note that there are two influences on the exchange 
rate:  higher foreign interest rates lead to a depreciation of  the franc, while 
a higher domestic  interest rate due to the  increase in domestic transactions 
leads  to  an  appreciation.  How  much  the  domestic  interest  rate  increases 
depends on the price elasticities,  gp2 and gp3, since higher price elasticities 
imply greater increases in domestic output. The franc appreciates if  the sum 
of  these  price  elasticities  exceeds  unity  and  depreciates  if  the  sum  is  less 
.34  XI 5  >  than  unity.  ut  > 0 as (gp2 + gp3) 2  1. If  the  franc  appreciates,  then 
domestic output increases less under flexible rates than  in the union.  A de- 
preciation, on the other hand, causes domestic output to increase more under 
flexible rates. Thus in the presence of this general demand disturbance,  the 
union  increases or decreases  the  variation  in output depending  on whether 
(gp2 + gp3)  is greater or less than one.35 
Positively Correlated Disturbances (Increase in Demand Concentrated 
More in One Country) 
The  final  aggregate  demand  disturbance  to  be  considered  represents  a 
modification  of  the general demand disturbance to allow for differences  in 
the  intensity  of  the  disturbance  between  the  two  foreign  countries.  Many 
demand expansions or contractions are highly correlated across countries but 
may  be  concentrated  more  in  one country  than  in  another.  Such  demand 
disturbances  can either strengthen or weaken the case for an exchange rate 
union  depending  on  which  country  experiences  the  greater  change  in 
demand. 
34.  In  the  union  (when  u;'  is constant), the  foreign  interest  rate  rises  by  u:  =  ~,!'~/k,, 
whereas the domestic interest rate rises by 
If (gp2 + gp3) > 1,  then the domestic interest rate rises more than the foreign interest rate; thus 
under flexible rates, the franc appreciates relative to the dollar and mark. But if  (gpz + gp3) < 
1, the franc depreciates. 
35.  An  analogous  condition  would  apply  to  a small country  choosing  between  fixed  and 
flexible exchange rates (i.e.,  where only one foreign country is involved). The above condition 
resembles  the  Marshall-Lerner  condition, which  requires  that  the  sum  of  the  elasticities  of 
export and import demand exceed one. These elasticities,  however, are  those of the aggregate 
demand function as a whole; in fact, as Appendix 2 shows, the Marshall-Lerner condition  is 
required in order for these elasticities to be  positive. When indexation is less than complete in 
the two foreign countries, the effect of  foreign demand disturbances depends not only on these 
price  elasticities  but  also on  the  relative  degree  of  indexation  in  the  domestic  and  foreign 
countries. Marston (1982) discusses the effect of different degrees of foreign indexation on the 
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The analysis of  this  more  general case,  however, can draw on the first 
two cases, since this disturbance can be regarded as a combination of  the 
first two.  Suppose that both  countries experience a demand expansion but 
that the expansion is greater in country 2 (or 3). Then the two disturbances 
take the form 
where  each disturbance includes a common  element (uf) modified by  the 
shift term (v;).’~ 
The general increase in demand (represented by  the uf factor) raises out- 
put  in country  1 under both  exchange rate  regimes.  Under  which  regime 
output expands more depends again on  the price elasticities. Suppose that 
(gpz + gp3) = 1,  so that the general increase in demand has the same effect 
on  output  in  the  union  as  under  flexible rates.  Then  the  choice between 
regimes depends on  which  country is more  subject to the demand distur- 
bance. 
Consider the case where trade is balanced between country 1 and the two 
foreign countries (the neutral  case considered in  section  12.1), but  where 
the increase in demand is more concentrated in country 2. Then, strangely 
enough,  country  1 is better off in the exchange rate union-tying  itself to 
the country with  greater demand disturbances. That is because changes in 
relative prices counter the effects of the general expansion.37 With the dis- 
turbance more concentrated in country 2, the terms of  trade of  that country 
rise and the mark appreciates. Under flexible rates, the franc also appreciates 
relative to the dollar, but by less than the mark does. By joining the union, 
country  1  ties  the  franc to  the  mark  and  finds its  output increasing less 
because of the dampening effect of the mark’s appreciation. 
When the increase in demand is more concentrated in country 3, in con- 
trast,  country  1 is worse off in the union. Now  the mark  depreciates, and 
the depreciation of  the mark exceeds that of  the franc. So joining the union 
further increases the effect of the disturbance on country 1’s output. 
Thus the net impact of this disturbance depends not only on price elastic- 
ities but also on the location of  the disturbance, with output variation being 
smaller in the union when the disturbance is concentrated in the union coun- 
try. This disturbance serves well to illustrate the pitfalls in easy generaliza- 
tions about how the sources of  economic disturbances affect the case for a 
union. 
36.  I assume that  y;‘  is proportional to uf,  = S uf, ‘where S is a fraction less than one so 
37. The  demand shift, however, is  assumed not  to  be  large enough to  lower country  1’s 
that  (I - S)  u;‘ > 0. 
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Summary of  Results for Demand Disturbances 
The form which  a foreign demand  disturbance takes  clearly determines 
how desirable an  exchange rate union would be.  Only in the case of  a de- 
mand shift between countries is there a definite presumption in favor of one 
regime or the other, but that presumption is in favor of flexible rates. In the 
second case, that of  a general increase in demand, the union is superior only 
if price elasticities are low. In the third case, where the disturbance is con- 
centrated more in one country than in the other, the result also depends on 
where the disturbance is primarily located. The final set of  disturbances to 
be  considered provides further evidence on  the  relative advantages of  the 
two regimes, while clarifying the role of  foreign wage indexation and trade 
patterns. 
12.3.4 Foreign Monetary Disturbances with No Indexation Abroad 
I now briefly investigate the effects of  monetary disturbances when there 
is no wage indexation abroad.  I  will show that the insulation properties of 
the flexible regime are very sensitive to the indexation assumption. Flexible 
rates do not generally provide full insulation from foreign monetary distur- 
bances if the foreign countries are less than fully indexed. But the case for 
flexible  exchange  rates  still remains  quite  strong.  I  will  also  investigate 
again the importance of  trade patterns. When the foreign countries are less 
than fully indexed, the trade pattern helps to determine the effects of  mon- 
etary disturbances, but  the influence of  trade bias is opposite to that com- 
monly assumed. 
I begin by  modifying the model of  the foreign economies for the case of 
no wage indexation. With no indexation, the supply equations for countries 
2 and 3 are changed to 
Since with  no  indexation wages  are fixed throughout the contract period, 
output in each country is responsive to the price of  that output alone. After 
solving the two-country model,  I can express the terms of  trade of  country 
2 and  the  price  of  country  3's  output  in  terms  of  the  monetary  distur- 
bances.  38 
38.  For  simplicity  I  have omitted aggregate demand disturbances  from these expressions, 
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where 
N3 = (1 + g’,)cfkl + (2g:  + g;[a -  (1 - u)]}(l  + kl + c’)  > 0,39 
N4 = k1cf(l -  g;)  + g{(l  + kl  + c’)  > 0 
N5 = - (g’,  + &)(l  - g’,)  + g<$  0. 
According  to  these  equations,  a  generalized  monetary  expansion,  where 
money  supplies  increase by  an equal  amount  in the two foreign countries, 
has no effect on the terms of trade but raises country 3’s price.  A monetary 
expansion in country 3 alone raises its own price but improves the terms of 
trade  of  country  2  by  causing  an  appreciation  of  the  mark  relative  to the 
dollar. A monetary  expansion  in country  2 has  an  indeterminate  effect  on 
country 3’s price but lowers country 2’s terms of trade. 
As in  the  earlier  section,  I  can express country  3’s interest rate  and the 
mark price of the dollar in terms of P:, T,, and the disturbances: 
(1  + cf)(P? -  P3) -  uy3 
43  = r,’ -  73  = 
kl 
Monetary disturbances generally affect both variables,  although as before an 
equal change in both money supplies has no effect on the exchange rate. 
Having  modified  the  foreign model  to eliminate wage  indexation,  I  will 
reexamine the relative advantages of the exchange rate union for both posi- 
tively and negatively correlated monetary disturbances. 
Positively Correlated Monetary Disturbances (General Increase  in 
Demand) 
If  the disturbance is a general one occumng simultaneously in both coun- 
tries, uy3 = uy2 = uy,  then flexible rates will not generally insulate country 
1 from the  disturbance  when  there  is no wage  indexation  abroad.  Under 
flexible rates, in fact, country  1’s economy is pushed in two contrary direc- 
tions by the disturbance.  The foreign monetary disturbance raises output in 
both foreign countries, and so there is an increase in demand for country  1’s 
product via this channel. But at the  same time an appreciation of the franc 
lowers the franc prices  of the two foreign goods.  The lower foreign prices 
by themselves  cause a reduction  in demand for country  1’s good. Because 
39.  I assume that N3  and N4  are positive. N’  must be positive if in each country there is no 
bias in consumption toward the foreign good (a 2 %). N4  must be positive if the cross-income 
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the foreign output and price effects oppose one another, country  1’s output 
can increase or decrease under flexible rates. 
By  using the expression for foreign outputs and interest rates introduced 
above, output in country 1 can be written as a function of  country 3’s price 
and the franc price of the dollar:40 
Because country 3’s price rises (as does country 2’s price), foreign output 
rises proportionally as reflected  in the first term above.  But under flexible 
rates, X: appreciates enough to lower the franc prices of both foreign goods: 
1  -1  (12)  u:I  = x, -  x =  -up3 
So the second term in (1 1) above, representing the effect of  changes in  the 
franc prices of  the foreign goods,  is negative. Country  1’s output rises or 
falls depending primarily on the sensitivity of  aggregate demand to foreign 
output, on the one hand, and to prices, on the other. 
In  the exchange rate  union,  this same monetary  disturbance unambigu- 
ously raises country  1’s output.  With  the  franc exchange rate  tied  to  the 
mark  and  the  mark-dollar rate  constant,  the  franc prices of  both  foreign 
goods rise along with  P;’ and P:. As a result of higher foreign output and 
prices, the demand for country 1’s good increases, as does its output. 
With  price effects countering foreign output effects only under  flexible 
rates, the advantage of exchange rate flexibility is evident in the case of this 
disturbance.  Although  full  insulation only  occurs  in  a  razor’s edge  case 
where foreign output and price effects exactly offset one another, country 
1’s output generally changes less under flexible rates than in the union. Only 
at extreme parameter values does the appreciation of  the franc become too 
much of  a good thing, increasing the variance of  output beyond that found 
in  the ~nion.~’ 
40.  In this expression and others later in the section, the real interest rate effect on country 
1’s aggregate demand is assumed to be equal to zero (g, = 0). None of the results would be 
changed if  this assumption were relaxed. 
41.  What is required is for country  1’s aggregate demand to be highly sensitive to relative 
prices,  but even with high price sensitivity flexible rates are superior as long as the change in 
the  foreign  interest  rate, and  hence  the  change  in the  franc  exchange  rate, is  not  unusually 
large.  For  further  discussion  of  this  question  (in the context  of  fixed  vs. flexible rates), see 
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Negatively Correlated Monetary Disturbances 
As  in  the  case of  an  aggregate demand disturbance,  flexible exchange 
rates are advantageous if monetary disturbances are negatively correlated, at 
least when trade is balanced. Country  1 can then benefit from the opposite 
movements in output and prices in the two foreign countries. The argument 
follows the same lines as that  in the earlier discussion. If  the disturbance 
takes the form of  an  increase in country 2’s money supply and decrease in 
country 3’s money supply, output rises in the former and falls in the latter. 
The terms of trade of  country 2 fall while the mark price of the dollar rises, 
with prices in the two foreign countries moving in opposite  direction^.^^ 
The effect on country 1’s output can be most easily understood by writing 
equation  (I)  in  table  12.1  in  terms  of  the  prices  and  exchange  rates  as 
follows: 
Exchange Rate Unions as  an Alternative to  Flexible Rates 
+ 
+ 
The  first  term  in  (13) represents the  effects of  changes in  foreign  output 
(which are proportional to up3), while the last two terms reflect the effects 
of changes in the franc prices of the two foreign goods: 
country 2’s good: up’  + uf’  + uT  = uTI2  + u:’  - uf212, 
country 3’s good: up3 + $’ =  -uTl2  + u:‘  -  uf2/2. 
If  country  1’s trade  is  balanced  between  the  two  foreign  countries,  the 
change in  foreign outputs  has  no  net  effect on country  1’s  output (since 
gy2 = gy3 in the first term above). As  far as price effects are concerned, the 
franc price of the dollar depreciates by exactly one-half of  the depreciation 
of  the mark relative to the dollar: 4’ = 4’12.  As  a result, the franc prices 
of the two foreign goods move by the same absolute amount but in opposite 
directions, so there is no net effect through changes in relative prices. Coun- 
try  1’s output is completely insulated from the disturbance. In the union, in 
42. Prices and outputs  in  the two foreign countries will  be negatively correlated for many 
other types of  monetary  disturbances  as well.  A  monetary  expansion  in  one  of  the  foreign 
countries, for example, leads to a fall in  price and output in the other country (for the case of 
high price elasticities, at least) because of the appreciation of the latter country’s exchange rate. 
The effects of  this disturbance on  country  1 are more complicated to analyze than the effects 
of  a negatively correlated  disturbance because movements in  foreign output are generally not 
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contrast, the franc depreciates  as much  as the  mark,  so country  1’s output 
rises.43 
Biases  in  trade patterns  produce  surprising  results,  however.  It  is trade 
biased  toward  country 3 rather than country 2 that provides  a case for the 
union.  The reason  lies  in  the  relative  movement  of  the  franc  in  the  two 
regimes.  If  trade is biased toward country 2, the direct effect of the shift in 
foreign output is to raise demand  for country  1’s good.  By tying the franc 
to the  mark  in  a union, the demand  for country  1’s good  is affected by  a 
larger depreciation than in the flexible regime, thus raising country  1’s out- 
put  even further. As  in the case of  balanced  trade,  therefore,  country  1’s 
output varies more in the union than under flexible rates. 
If  trade  is biased  toward country  3, however,  the  shift in foreign  output 
lowers demand  for country  1’s good, so a larger depreciation may  help to 
stabilize output. The effect of the disturbance on country  1’s output may be 
smaller in the  union  than in the  flexible regime,  depending on the  relative 
magnitudes of  the output and price effects.  In  the union,  in fact, domestic 
output can actually remain constant in the face of this disturbance with the 
effect of the shift in foreign output being neutralized  by the depreciation of 
the  franc relative  to the  dollar.44 Thus  trade biased  toward  the rest  of  the 
world rather than the union country provides the best case for the union. 
12.4  Conclusion 
This paper has shown how an exchange rate union would affect a country 
subject to monetary and aggregate demand disturbances originating at home 
or abroad.  How  much difference a union makes depends first of all on do- 
mestic wage behavior.  Any disturbance has an identical  effect on output in 
the home country under flexible rates or in an exchange rate union if  wages 
are fully indexed to the general price level. Short of full indexation, the case 
for a union is stronger if monetary disturbances originate at home rather than 
abroad and weaker if  domestic demand disturbances are important.  But the 
advantage  of one regime  over another diminishes  the  closer is the  country 
to full indexation. 
As far as foreign disturbances  are concerned,  the  form which  those dis- 
turbances take is crucial. When the disturbances are perfectly correlated gen- 
eral disturbances.  the choice between a union and flexible rates is based on 
43. In the union, the franc prices of both foreign goods rise. In the case of country 2’s good, 
the franc price rises despite the fall in the terms of trade since u:/2  + u:’  ~  uf2/2 = (uf  + 
44. In  the union  the franc  prices of  both foreign  goods always  rise,  thus tending to  raise 
country  1’s output. Only when trade is biased toward country 3 does the foreign output effect 
run counter to this price effect (since then (gv2 -  gv3) < 0). For some parameter values,  Yj - 
Y’  = 0 in  equation  (13),  so that country  1’s output  is  completely  insulated from the distur- 
bance. 
u:2y2  > 0. 
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the same criteria as the choice between fixed and flexible rates. Other forms 
of  disturbances,  however,  introduce some of  the complexities involved in 
trading with two or more regions. Among the most important is the corre- 
lation pattern  itself.  The domestic country generally benefits from having 
foreign disturbances less than perfectly correlated. Indeed, a country may be 
completely insulated from negatively correlated disturbances under flexible 
rates, depending on the pattern of  trade, even though it might not be insu- 
lated from monetary or aggregate demand disturbances when they are per- 
fectly correlated between countries.  The key  to  the  insulation lies  in the 
movement of the exchange rate; if the exchange rate is fixed to one of  the 
two  foreign currencies,  the  advantage of  the  negative correlation is  lost. 
Second, for most disturbances, the pattern of trade is important because it 
determines how the outputs and prices of  different foreign countries affect 
the domestic economy.  But patterns of  trade biased toward the rest of  the 
world rather than the union partner strengthen the case for a union, at least 
in the presence of foreign monetary disturbances. Third, the sources of dis- 
turbances are important, although as the last demand disturbance illustrated, 
sometimes it is best for the disturbances to  originate in  the union  partner 
rather than the rest of the world. 
The effects of  an exchange rate union are no doubt complex, and factors 
which we might think would strengthen the case for a union may sometimes 
weaken it.  As  a result,  it is difficult to build  a case in favor of joining  a 
union.  On  the other  hand,  the  analysis above provides no  overwhelming 
case for flexible rates either. To choose between the two regimes, empirical 
evidence is indispensable-evidence  on structural behavior, the sources and 
types of economic disturbances, and other factors emphasized in this paper. 
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Appendix  1: List of  Variables 
All variables are in logarithms except interest rates. The innovations in some 
variables are included in parentheses. 
C(c.1 = output in country i, 
~f($)  = price of country i’s output, 
T,(ur) = terms of  trade of country 2, Pz - (P: + X:), 
X:(u:)  = exchange rate (see figure 12.  l), 
ri(u:i) = interest rate of country i, 
ti  = general price level in country i, 
,EJ, + , = expected value of a variable at t  +  1, J,  + ,, based on 
information available at t, 
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nominal wage of  country i, 
nominal contract wage of country i, 
money supply of country i, 
monetary, aggregate demand disturbances of  country i, 
perfectly correlated foreign monetary, aggregate demand 
disturbances, 
negatively correlated foreign monetary, aggregate demand 
disturbances. 
Appendix 2: The Aggregate Demand Function 
The foreign output and price coefficients in the aggregate demand equation 
play  a major role  in the  analysis of  foreign disturbances,  This  Appendix 
derives the aggregate demand equation from a more traditional equation (in 
level form) and interprets the output and  price coefficients in terms of  this 
more traditional model. 
I begin  with  an expression relating output to  expenditure, exports,  and 
imports: 
('41)  Q'  = C'(Q)' + EX2(Q2,  R) + EX3(Q3,  I?) 
-  R IM2(Q', R) -  R IM3(Q',  R). 
All variables are expressed in level form with the time subscripts omitted. 
Q'  and  C'  are domestic output and expenditure in country  i, respectively, 
while EX'  is the demand for exports of country  I  by  country i and IM'  is the 
demand for imports from country i by  country  I. To simplify the analysis, 
I assume that  there are no changes in the terms of  trade between the two 
foreign countries  and  that  the  dollar prices of  the  two  foreign  goods are 
initially equal. Thus R  can represent the terms of  trade between either for- 
eign country and country  1.  I  also assume that  trade is  initially balanced 
with each foreign country so that EX'  = RIM', and that R is initially equal 
to one. 
Define the following elasticities, where the partial derivative with respect 
to the first (second) argument of  a function has the subscript 1 (2): 
h, = income elasticity of  foreign demand for country 1's good, 
= EX;  (Q'IEX')  , 
nfi = price elasticity of foreign demand for country 1's good, 
= EX;(R/EX'), 
n' = price elasticity of domestic demand for country i's good, 
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Also, define d equal to the sum of the marginal propensities to save and to 
import by  country 1 = (1 - C:) + IM:  + IM: > 0. Then equation (Al) 
can be written in terms of percentage changes as follows: 
+ 
Thus the coefficients of the aggregate demand equation in the text, which is 
expressed in logarithms, can be written 
The relative sizes of the gyi  coefficients depend on the income elasticities in 
the two foreign countries (hi) as well as the share of  exports to country i as 
a fraction of  total domestic output. The relative sizes of  the gpi coefficients 
depend on the underlying price elasticities as well  as the share of  exports. 
The Marshall-Lerner condition for the trade balance between country 1 and 
country i is nfi  + ni - 1 > 1, a condition which is necessary for g,,  to be 
positive. 
Comment  Peter B. Kenen 
The fundamental problem with  which  Marston is concerned, the choice of 
exchange rate regime  for  a small  economy,  is  one that  has  been  studied 
frequently. In too many cases, however, the models used to analyze it have 
been  excessively simple.  In  some models, for example, purchasing power 
parity deprives the real exchange rate of any role in the adjustment process; 
in  consequence,  a  flexible  exchange rate  cannot  insulate domestic output 
from shifts of  foreign demand and other real  shocks coming from abroad. 
In many models, the outside world is represented by  a single foreign coun- 
try, and the choice between a fixed and a flexible exchange rate is necessar- 
ily posed  in all-or-nothing terms; a fixed exchange rate internalizes all ex- 
ternal disturbances. Finally, most papers on this subject examine the effects 
45. In  cases where the terms of trade change between countries 2 and  3, there are  additional 
cross effects of changes in the  prices of  goods in  the  third  country which further  complicate 
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of  one or two  disturbances;  one  wonders  whether  the  conclusions  would 
stand up to the inclusion of  additional disturbances. 
Marston’s  paper  is  much  better  than  most  others  in  all  three  of  these 
dimensions.  His  treatment  of  goods  markets  is  more  general, because  it 
allows  the  real  exchange rate  to change. His  framework  is  more  realistic, 
because  the  country  under  study  trades  with  two  other  countries,  and  an 
exchange rate  union  with  one  of  those  countries  does not  internalize  all 
foreign disturbances.  His treatment of  disturbances is more comprehensive, 
because there are so many of  them. If  Marston’s results  are a bit bewilder- 
ing, even after he has introduced a number of  simplifications, he should be 
congratulated rather than criticized.  The real world is bewildering too. 
This is an important paper, and the critical comments made below do not 
diminish  it  in  any major  way.  They  should  be  regarded  as proposals  for 
more work rather than objections to the work that Marston has reported. My 
comments fall into three groups.  I begin with two comments on the structure 
of the model. I turn next to the way that Marston has made his comparisons. 
I conclude with comments on the objective function he uses to assess fixed 
and flexible exchange rates. 
I find it a bit difficult to understand Marston’s labor market. If  1 interpret 
his equations correctly, his  contract  wage  is set so that  the corresponding 
real  wage will  clear the  labor  market.  (The contract  wage  divided  by  the 
expected  price of the domestic product is equal to the marginal product  of 
labor at full employment output.) Furthermore,  the supply of labor is inelas- 
tic. It does not depend on either of the two real wages-the  one defined by 
the  price  of  the  domestic  product  or the  one defined  by  the  price  index. 
Nevertheless,  there  is  wage  indexation,  and  it  takes  a  strange  form. The 
contract  wage is raised  or lowered by  some fraction of  the  error  made  in 
forecasting the price index.  If the price index and the forecast of that index 
do not  affect the contract  wage, why  should the error made in forecasting 
the  index be allowed  to influence the actual  wage? There may  be  nothing 
fundamentally wrong with this specification. But it puzzles me. 
Marston’s  goods markets  give the real  exchange rate  an  important role. 
Home and foreign goods are not perfect substitutes.  His assets markets are 
very much  more primitive.  Home and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes. 
This assumption  makes  Marston’s  model  much  more  manageable  but  ren- 
ders his  analysis  somewhat less  interesting.  On the  one hand,  it deprives 
monetary policy of  any influence on aggregate demand, apart from the influ- 
ence it  exercises  by  way  of  its  effect  on  the  nominal  exchange  rate  and 
therefore the real rate. On the other hand, it may be responsible for one of 
Marston’s  strong results-that  a flexible  exchange rate  can afford full and 
instantaneous insulation from certain external disturbances. 
To illustrate my problem  with  the way Marston uses his model to study 
the  effects  of  fixed  and  flexible exchange rates,  I  will  concentrate  on  his 
treatment  of  domestic  disturbances,  summarized  by  his  equations  (4) and 439 
(5). The effects of these disturbances are clearcut, compared to others, and 
least dependent on the trade pattern. 
When  indexation  is incomplete,  a random  increase in domestic demand 
raises real output, and the increase is larger when the exchange rate is fixed 
than when it is flexible (because the domestic currency cannot appreciate to 
dampen  the  impact  of  the  disturbance).  Score  5  points,  then,  against  an 
exchange rate  union.  But  a random  increase  in  the money  supply has  no 
effect  on real  output  when  the  exchange rate  is  fixed and  increases  real 
output when the rate is flexible. Score 5 points in favor of  an exchange rate 
union. 
Is this the right way to keep score? If  changes in  the money  stock  are 
completely random, as in Marston’s paper, it may be satisfactory.  But there 
is another way of coming at the problem.  Let us give the central bank ex- 
traordinary  insight.  Let it be able to identify immediately the random fluc- 
tuations  in  domestic  demand  and  introduce  offsetting  fluctuations  in  the 
money  supply to neutralize  their  influence on  real  output.  It can do so in 
principle with a flexible exchange rate. It has merely to set the left-hand side 
of equation (4) at zero, solve for the exchange rate change that offsets the 
random  change in  domestic demand, and  insert that  change into equation 
(5)  to calculate the change in the money supply that will produce the requi- 
site change in the exchange rate.  In other words, it can conduct a managed 
float to  stabilize  domestic  output.  We  have  therefore  to  score  10  points 
against a union. The first 5 are those it lost because fluctuations in domestic 
demand  lead  to  larger  output  changes  when  no  one does  anything  about 
them. The next 5 are lost because the union emasculates monetary policy. 
With  full indexation,  my  objection disappears.  The exchange rate  term 
drops out of equation (4), because indexation pegs the real rate, and there 
is no link between the money stock and real output. In Marston’s terms, the 
central bank  is rendered  harmless.  In  my terms,  it is rendered  helpless.  It 
cannot conduct a managed float to stabilize domestic output. 
This illustration raises two broad questions. First, when we compare ex- 
change rate regimes, how should we weigh their impact on economic poli- 
cies? Do we want to minimize the damage that policies can do when con- 
ducted badly or maximize the contribution they can make when conducted 
well?  Second, how should  we  approach institutional  arrangements such as 
indexation? Should they be regarded as immutable features of the economy, 
or should we stress the need to change them? (When Marston gave his paper 
at Bellagio, in January 1982, he and I would probably have said that index- 
ation  is pernicious but  immutable,  and  we  would  therefore  have  said that 
exchange  rate  arrangements  must  be  built  around  it.  This  version  of  my 
comment was drafted in  July  1982, and events in  the interim have led me 
to change my  mind. Indexation has been attacked successfully in one of its 
strongholds, Belgium, and is under attack in another, Italy.) 
I have one other problem with the way that Marston treats wage indexa- 
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tion.  In  most  of  his paper, he  assumes  that  indexation  is complete  in  the 
two foreign countries.  Having tried to work my way through certain distur- 
bances without  making this  assumption,  I  know  why  he adopts it. Does it 
make sense, however,  to assume that indexation  is complete in  the foreign 
countries but incomplete in the small country? This asymmetry is not crucial 
for some of  Marston’s  main  results.  It  is crucial for others.  (I was at first 
tempted to ridicule this  asymmetry by asking a rhetorical question.  Would 
Germany,  where  wage  rates  are  not  indexed,  want  to join  a  union  with 
countries whose wage rates are completely indexed? But Germany belongs 
to a union  in which indexation is widespread! Marston may have taken the 
right tack after all.) 
My final comment has to do with the objective function implicit  in Mar- 
ston’s comparison between fixed and flexible exchange rates. They are com- 
pared exclusively in terms of  their effects on the volatility of real output. At 
several important points in his paper, however, Marston notes that they have 
different effects on prices-on  the domestic product price and on the price 
index.  A comprehensive  comparison  between  them, then,  should examine 
their  effects on prices  as well  as their effects  on real  output.  There is, of 
course, a problem here.  When two arguments appear in the objective func- 
tion, we have to give them weights,  and those weights  will affect the com- 
parison between exchange rate regimes.  But when we look at one argument 
without looking  at the other, we  are likewise using  weights  and failing to 
confront the choice that we have made. 
Marston has constructed an interesting model and used it to produce im- 
portant results.  What more can he do with it? 
If  I were writing one more paper based on this model,  I  would adopt two 
of  the  suggestions  in  this  comment. First,  I  would  take  the  “optimistic” 
view  of  monetary  policy,  asking  what  it can  do to  stabilize output  under 
alternative  exchange  rate  arrangements  rather  than  asking  how  those 
arrangements can minimize its nuisance value. Returning to my earlier illus- 
tration,  I  would  use equations  (4) and  (5)  to endogenize  monetary  policy. 
Second, I  would  try to remove the worrisome asymmetry between degrees 
of indexation, even if  this made the analysis more difficult. 
If  I were amending  the model itself,  I  would  introduce imperfect  substi- 
tutability between  home  and foreign bonds.  Monetary policy  would be  ef- 
fective under a fixed exchange rate, if  only in the  short run, and a flexible 
exchange rate would not confer full insulation, except in the long run. 
I  have one more suggestion. It  would  be  interesting to introduce a non- 
traded  good, to assign to monetary  policy  the  task  of  stabilizing total  em- 
ployment  in the face of random  shocks,  and to look at the effects of fixed 
and  flexible  exchange rates on employment  in each sector (i.e., on the  al- 
location  of  the  labor force).  Critics of  current exchange  rate  arrangements 
seem to be  worrying  about this  sort of  problem.  Individual  industries and 441 
regions, they  say, are affected seriously by  the short-term changes in  real 
exchange rates brought about by  macroeconomic policies and shocks. These 
sectoral effects may bear some blame for the recrudescence of  protectionist 
pressures and for dissatisfaction with exchange rate flexibility. 
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